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Comments
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DUE PROCESS AND
PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPAL CLAIMS AND LIENS
I. INTRODUCTION
Adequate local government requires power to provide build-
ings essential to the functioning of the municipality such as the
courthouse or town hall. Public interest and welfare justifies the
construction of schools, firehalls and hospitals. The same public
interest justifies construction of water and sewer systems, street,
curbs and sidewalks.' These latter public improvements are of
benefit to the general public, to be sure, but also result in special
benefit 2 to the real property abutting or adjoining the public struc-
ture. There are no data on the amount expended on public im-
provements by all municipalities in Pennsylvania.3 However, fig-
ures show that one borough with a population of less than 30,000
completed street construction costing $78,331.76 in 1971 and the
owners of abutting properties were assessed $45,428.78 of this cost.4
1. E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUICIPAL CORPORATIONs § 37.02
(3d ed. 1971).
2. Id. at § 37.01.
3. MUNICIPAL STATISTICS AND RECORDS DIVISION, PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T
OF COMMUNITY AFAIRS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL STATISTICS, FINAL
SUMMARY (1969). This report shows a total figure for capital improve-
ments but makes no breakdown of the figure.
4. DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS or THE BOROUGH OF POTTSTOWN,CAPITAL IM-
PROVEMENTS RECAP. (1971). In addition to the $45,428.78 accessments,
$7,306.29 was charged to adjoining municipalities for construction of streets
on the boundaries. The average cost per front foot assessed was $7.25.
In the same period, sidewalk and curb costing $64,772.74 were installed at
the direction and expense of property owners; had the borough done this
work, the cost would have been assessable.
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If public improvements are to be made, there must be a method of
paying for them.' In Pennsylvania the procedure under which the
municipalities make assessments and file municipal claims as liens
against real property to secure payment of the assessments is pro-
vided for in the various enabling provisions of the Municipal
Codes6 and the Municipal Claims Act.'
This Comment will assume that municipalities have the right,
power, or duty to make public improvements such as water or
sewer works, streets, curbs and sidewalks, and the theoretical right
or power to assess costs and place liens on certain real estate.
This Comment will explore the authority of the municipality to
make assessments and file claims as liens under existing Pennsyl-
vania law and examine the means of redress available to property
owners challanging assessments and liens. Such analysis will sug-
gest that the municipality is clearly in a favored position. 8 The fa-
vored position of municipalities in Pennsylvania has been attacked
in a recent suit filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in the case of Sager v. Burgess
and Borough Council of Pottstown.9 In that case, the plaintiffs,
on behalf of themselves and members of their class, sought to have
the Pennsylvania Municipal Claims Act declared unconstitutional
insofar as it authorizes municipalities to file claims as liens against
real estate without prior notice of the lien and an opportunity for
the property owner to be heard.10 The plaintiffs sought an injunc-
tion against the filing of such liens and further sought to have ex-
punged all liens previously filed under the Act." The district
court, after ordering a three-judge court to hear and determine
the issues raised, dismissed plaintiffs' complaint.'
2
Recently many courts have held" and commentators have urged
that statutory procedures for prejudgment garnishment of wages,13
5. See generally McQuillin, supra note 1, at § 37.57.
6. See, e.g., Borough Code, PA. STAT. ANat. tit. 53, §§ 45101-48501
(1966); First Class Township Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§55101-58502
(1957); Third Class City Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 35101-39701 (1957).
Most citations in this Comment are to the Borough Code; other codes are
similar but specific provisions may differ.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 7101-7505 (1957).
8. See notes 119-121 and accompanying text infra.
9. Civil No. 72-1115 (E.D. Pa., filed June 7, 1972).
10. Complaint at 1, Sager v. Burgess and Borough of Pottstown, Civil
No. 72-1115 (E.D. Pa., filed June 7, 1972).
11. Id. at 10.
12. Memorandum Opinion dated November 20, 1972 at 11, Sager v.
Burgess and Borough of Pottstown, Civil No. 72-1115 (E.D. Pa., filed June
7, 1972).
13. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Comment,
distress sale of a tenant's personal property, 14 replevin of chat-
tels, 5 and execution on innkeepers' liens"6 do not meet the re-
quirements of due process of law. The basis for the decision in
each case was that the individual had been deprived of a property
interest without prior notice and a hearing required by the four-
teenth amendment."7 In Sager the plaintiffs contended that the
protection outlined in these cases extends to the statutory proce-
dure for filing municipal claims requiring that "notice and an op-
portunity to a hearing must be afforded a real property owner
prior to the filing of a [municipal] lien on his property."' This
Comment will, therefore, consider the requirements of due process
of law applicable to the filing of a municipal claim.' 9 Finally, this
Comment will suggest legislative changes in certain provisions of
the Municipal Claims Act aimed at adjusting the relative posi-
tions of the municipality and the property owner.
II. PENNSYLVANIA PROCEDURE FOR MUNICIPAL
ASSESSMENTS AND LIENS
The authority of a particular municipal corporation or local
governing body with respect to public improvements depends on
the state constitution, the municipal charter, and the applicable
state statutes.20 This section of the Comment will deal with the
Pennsylvania statutory provisions and the judicial interpretations
thereof authorizing public improvements, assessments, and munici-
pal claims as liens on real estate.
A. Improvements and Special Assessments
The local governing body, after deciding to undertake a cer-
tain public improvement, must enact an ordinance to authorize the
improvement.2 ' A borough council is authorized to enact such
ordinances "not inconsistant with the laws of the Commonwealth
as it shall deem beneficial to the borough and to provide for en-
The Constitutional Validity of Attachment In Light of Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 837 (1970).
14. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Note,
Landlord Distraint and Judicial Restraint: A Look At Santiago v. McElroy,
44 TEmp. L. Q. 565 (1971).
15. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
16. Khim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
17. See generally Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process
Into A New Substance: An Expanding Protection For Personal Liberty and
A "Specialized Type of Property . . . In Our Economic System," 66 Nw.
U. L. REv. 502 (1971).
18. Brief of Plaintiffs at 3, Sager v. Burgess and Borough of Potts-
town, Civil No. 72-1116 (E.D. Pa., filed June 7, 1972).
19. Much of what is said may be applicable to municipal tax liens
which are also filed under the Act.
20. McQuILLIN, supra note 1, at § 37.01.
21. See generally L. HECHT, PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPAL CLAIMS AND
TAx LIENs § 53.1 (1967).
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forcement of the same."22 The Pennsylvania Borough Code au-
thorizes improvement of borough streets,23 laying and construc-
tion of sidewalks and curbs,24 and establishment and construction
of sanitary sewer systems.25 Any ordinance must be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality. 26 Notice
published in a local newspaper is sufficient to constitute due proc-
ess of law to validate an ordinance providing for a public improve-
ment. 27 It is from this published notice of the ordinance authoriz-
ing work on a public improvement abutting the owner's property
that he receives his first "knowledge" that a special assessment will
be forthcoming.
At this point the legality of the ordinance may be tested. Sec-
tion 1010 of the Borough Code provides:
Complaint as to the legality of any ordinance or resolution
may be made to the court of quarter sessions . . . by any
person aggrieved within thirty days after the enactment of
any ordinance or the adoption of any resolution, and the
determination and order of the court thereon shall be con-
clusive.
28
This statutory remedy, however, is limited. In Reeder v. Borough
of Hatfield,29 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
[W]e have consistantly held that the only questions the
court of quarter sessions can consider relate to defects in
the process of enactment of the ordinance and that it has no
jurisdiction to decide substantive issues concerning the or-
dinance's validity. 0
Generally, a statutory remedy for testing the validity of an ordi-
nance is exclusive. 31 Therefore, in light of the statement in Reeder
quoted above, the remedy of Section 1010 is exclusive as to pro-
cedural defects, i.e. the ordinance was not adopted under the pro-
cedure prescribed by the Borough Code. The thirty day limitation
of Section 1010 would apply to actions on procedural defects and
an action in equity would be improper in this situation. 32 On the
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46006(3) (1966).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46761 (1966).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46801 (1966).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 47001 (1966).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46008 (1966).
27. Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46010 (1966). See also PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 56502 (1957).
29. 439 Pa. 241, 266 A.2d 691 (1970).
30. Id. at 245, 266 A.2d at 694.
31. See In re Borough of State College, 104 Pa. Super. 211, 158 A.
298 (1932).
32. Binder v. Pottstown Borough, 71 Montg. 237 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
other hand, where the issues are substantive ones, it would seem
Section 1010 is not the exclusive or even the proper remedy and
the thirty day limitation of the section would not apply to actions
on the substantive issues. In Reeder the court concluded:
It hardly seems reasonable that the legislature intended
that ordinances be immune from constitutional or other
challenge after 30 days. Therefore, appellees and the
court below are in error when they state that § 1010 of the
Borough Code was the method appellant should have used
to test the substantive validity of the ordinance.3 3
Although Section 1010 is not the proper remedy to test the
substantive validity of an ordinance, there is dispute over whether
the proper remedy is an action in equity.34 The bar to equity that
there is a full and adequate remedy at law under the Borough
Code was rejected by the court in Reeder. Another obstacle to a
challenge of the substantive validy of an ordinance in a court of
equity is the doctrine of ripeness.35 When the ordinance has been
enacted but no action of enforcement or implementation is under-
taken, the issue of validy of the ordinance is said to be not yet ripe
for judicial determination. 6 The courts have concluded that a suit
to test the validity of an ordinance prior to any municipal action un-
der the ordinance is a premature attempt to obtain an advisory
opinion and that the suit is dismissed without prejudice to raise
the issues at the proper time.3 7
Moreover, it is well settled that the exercise of discretionary
power by the proper municipal officials within statutory limits
will not be reviewed by the courts unless fraud, oppression, or
arbitrary action can be shown.38 Courts will not interfere on the
ground that a given public improvement is unnecessary.3 9 Thus,
the decision on the propriety of constructing a sewer system is
within the discretion of the borough or city council and the de-
cision is not reviewable by the courts except under extraordinary
33. Roeder v. Borough of Hatfield, 439 Pa. 241, 246, 266 A.2d 691, 694
(1970).
34. See Binder v. Pottstown Borough, 71 Montg. 237 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
See also Wood v. Goldvarg, 365 Pa. 92, 74 A.2d 100 (1950). But see Sipe
v. Borough of Tarentum, 263 Pa. 338, 106 A. 637 (1919).
35. Roeder v. Borough of Hatfield, 439 Pa. 241, 248, 266 A.2d 691,
695 (1970).
36. Id.
37. In Roeder, the court stated:
Regardless of when the [zoning] ordinance became effective
nothing had happened under the ordinance to create a case or con-
troversy ripe for judicial intervention. They [property owners] had
not sought nor had they been denied the right to engage in activi-
ties on their land. Nor had there been any indication or threat of
enforcement [of the ordinance]. The principle applies whether
the premature attack is by an action in equity or through the
administrative framework. ...
Id.
38. McQu.LwN, supra note 1, at § 37.25.
39. Fyfe v. Borough of Turtle Creek, 22 Pa. Super. 292 (1903).
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circumstances. 40 Furthermore, the municipality is free to decide
the nature, extent, location, materials and method of financing
(among the plans authorized by statute) of the public improve-
ment.41 A suit in equity to block construction of a public im-
provement, although possible, has little chance of success.42 Like-
wise, a suit challenging the validity of assessments of cost, once
the improvement has been completed, will probably result in a
disappointed petitioner.4 3
In Pennsylvania, specific enabling legislation authorizes muni-
cipalities to make certain improvements and assessments. The
Borough Code, for example, provides that boroughs may improve
streets and assess owners of abutting real estate for the cost;44 lay
out, ordain, and construct sanitary sewers 45 and assess property
owners by the front-foot rule46 or according to benefits; 47 and lay
out, ordain and establish sidewalks and curbs,48 and where the
borough does the work, collect cost plus ten percent.49 In the case
of an assessment for street improvement, the authorizing ordinance
must have been published once in a newspaper of general circula-
tion in the borough50 and "the borough secretary . . .shall cause
thirty days' personal notice of the assessment to be given to each
party assessed." 51  Ordinances pertaining to construction of sani-
tary sewers must be published once a week for four weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality5 2 and the
borough secretary must cause thirty days' notice of the assessment
to be given.5 3 Where construction or repairs of sidewalk and curb
40. See Banksville Ave. 90 Pitts L. J. 612 (Pa. C.P. 1942); Armstrong
v. Hughesville Borough, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 401 (Lycom. 1962); HECHT, supra
note 21, at § 53.2.
41. MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, at § 37.52.
42. See Ashcom v. Borough of Westmont, 298 Pa. 203, 148 A. 112
(1929).
43. One writer has remarked:
It [this Comment] will serve a useful purpose, if only to demon-
strate that most court attacks against assessments have failed, that
an attorney and his client will save time and money by recognizing
this fact before initiation of a lawsuit rather than after its unsuc-
cessful conclusion....
Comment, How Not To Contest Special Assessments in California, 17 STAN.
L. REv. 247, 247 (1965).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46761 (1966).
45. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 53, § 47001 (1966).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 47003 (1966).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 47002 (1966).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46801 (1966).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46805 (1966).
50. In re Borough of Lemoyne, 176 Pa. Super. 38, 107 A.2d 149 (1954).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46762 (1966) (emphasis added).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 47010 (1966).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 47003 (1966) (emphasis added).
is ordained, the ordinance must have been published once64 and the
borough must serve notice to construct or repair; only upon neg-
lect of the property owner may the borough do the work and
charge costsA5 In every case where the assessment remains un-
paid at the end of a period set by the statute or ordinance, the acts
provide for the filing of liens against the real estate "in the same






It is necessary to understand that the Municipal Claims Act
does not stand alone as complete authorization for the filing of
municipal liens if the Act is to be viewed in its proper perspective.
All of the statutes providing for enactment of ordinances, initia-
tion of public works and levy of special assessments for the costs
thereof must be read together with the Municipal Claims Act. The
Act governs filing and collection; that is, the provisions are for
enforcement of an already validly existing claim.57 In other
words, the basis of a valid municipal claim is the assessment for
public improvements and for the assessment to be valid it must
comply with various provisions of the Municipal Code.58 "Munici-
pal claim," as used in the Act, means, inter alia, the claim filed to
recover for grading and paving or otherwise improving public
streets, paving, repaving or constructing footways and curb and
laying sanitary sewers, branch sewers or sewer connections. 9  It
is such a claim which may be filed by the municipality against real
estate of an owner who has failed to pay an assessment when due.
The Act provides:
All municipal claims which may hereafter be lawfully im-
posed or assessed on any property in the Commonwealth
and all such claims heretofore lawfully imposed or assessed
... in the manner and to the extent hereinafter set forth
shall be and they are hereby declared to be a lien on said
property .... 60
Under prior law,81 notice of intention to file the lien was in-
dispensibleA2 Current law provides for notice of the assessment 8
which, in effect, is the assessment bill, but current law makes no
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46008 (1966).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 46805, 46806 (1966).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 46763, 46805, 46806, 47007 (1966). See also
HECHT, supra note 21, at § 53.6.
67. HECHT, supra note 21, at § 53.6.
58. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
59. PA. STAT. ANN tit. 53, § 7101 (1957).
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7106 (1957).
61. Act of March 23, 1866, No. 275, § 1 [1866] PA. LAws 303 (repealed
1923).
62. Philadelphia v. Dungan, 124 Pa. 52, 16 A. 524 (1889).
63. See notes 52 and 54 and accompanying text supra.
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requirement for notice of intention to file except in claims filed
to use.64 As to filing, the Act states:
[M] unicipal claims must be filed in [the court of common
pleas of the county in which the property is situated]
within six months from the time the work was done in
front of the particular property where the charge against
the property is assessed or made at the time the work is au-
thorized; within six months after the completion of the im-
provement where the assessment is made by the munici-
pality upon all properties after the completion of the im-
provement; and within six months after confirmation of the
court where confirmation is required; the certificate of the
surveyor, engineer or other official supervising . . . being
conclusive of the time of completion thereof.6 5
Clearly, the statute provides for three distinct situations varying
by the event which initiates the running of the six month period
within which liens may be validly filed. The municipality selects
which procedure it will follow in drafting the ordinance authoriz-
ing the public project. 6  The provision for confirmation of the
court is self-explanatory and is the most definite as to the begin-
ning of the six month period. The other two provisions have been
the subject of considerable litigation. 7
It is a general principle that there can be no special assessment
unless the property is benefited by the work done.68 Thus, the
municipality may assess according to benefits69 or according to the
front-foot method.70 Assessment by the front-foot method is
made by charging a certain amount, set by the ordinance, for each
foot of the property owner's land abutting the street or sewer.71
This method is one of convenience only and is justified on the
ground that there is a presumption of benefit to abutting proper-
64. PA. STAT. ANN tit. 53, § 7142 (1957). To use claims are those
filed by the contractor who did the work, not by the municipality for
whom the work was done.
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, 7143 (1957).
66. See HECHT, supra note 21, at § 56.
67. See, e.g., Versailles Township v. Ulm, 152 Pa. 384, 33 A.2d 265
(1943); Philadelphia v. Hey, 20 Pa. Super. 480 (1902); Philadelphia v.
Beatty, 9 Pa. Super. 255 (1899); Upper Moreland-Hatboro Joint Sewer Auth.
v. Fulmer Heights Home Ownership Ass'n, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 217 (Montg.
1961).
68. MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, at § 38.02. See also Upper Moreland-
Hatboro Joint Sewer Auth. v. Pearson, 190 Pa. Super 107, 152 A.2d 774
(1959); Hartin v. Abington Twp., 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 505 (Montg. 1960).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 47002 (1966).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 47003 (1966).
71. See HECHT, supra note 21, at § 53.3.1.
ties.72 It may be a presumption of actual benefit but actual bene-
fit is not essential as in the case of a sewer abutting unimproved
property, where the possibility of future improvement of the prop-
erty, hence future benefit, is enough to invoke the presumption."a
The presumption is rebuttable, but the burden of proof is on the
property owner.7"
It would seem that the property owner could show no benefit
or rebut the presumption of benefit where the improvement, the
sewer system, is completed in front of his property but not usea-
ble because the treatment or pumping stations are not yet com-
plete. Notwithstanding this reasoning, the provision authorizing
liens within six months of the "time the work was done in front of
the particular property"7 5 seems to provide authority for valid as-
sessments and liens even though the sewer is not useable at the
time.76 Similarly, the reasoning requiring benefit before an as-
sessment can be valid suggests that the provision authorizing liens
"within six months after the time of completion of the improve-
ment"77 should be interpreted as requiring actual physical comple-
tion. In Versailles Township v. Elm,75 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the word completion in the Act means "lawful and
authoritative as well as physical completion," 79 "lawfully useable
for the purpose intended [and] not lacking in any essential
part."80  In that case the work on the sewer system was actually
completed more than six months prior to the filing of the lien and
there was a connection to the treatment facilities of a neighboring
municipality which had agreed to accept sewage, but the ordinance
authorizing the agreement between the municipalities had been
signed within the six month period. The court ruled the lien was
valid. 1 In such a situation the six month period within which
claims may be filed runs from the date of actual physical comple-
72. Upper Yoder Township Auth. v. Gregory, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 96
(Camb. 1964).
73. Upper Moreland-Hatboro Joint Sewer Auth. v. Fulmer Heights
Home Ownership Ass'n, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 217 (Montg. 1961).
74. Upper Yoder Township Auth. v. Gregory, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 96
(Camb, 1964).
75. PA. STAT. Am. tit. 53, § 7143 (1957).
76. Philadelphia v. Beatty, 9 Pa. Super. 255 (1899). See also Phila-
delphia v. Hey, 20 Pa. Super. 480 (1902); Upper Moreland-Hatboro Joint
Sewer Auth. v. Fulmer Heights Home Ownership Ass'n 27 Pa. D. & C.2d
(Montg. 1961).
77. PA. STAT. Am. tit. 53, § 7143 (1957).
78. 152 Pa. 384, 33 A.2d 265 (1943).
79. rd. at 387, 33 A.2d at 267.
80. rd. at 388-89, 33 A.2d at 267.
81. The court, in discussing completion, stated:
Appellants' [property owners'] interpretation would have obligated
them to pay their assessment although the sewer may never have
been made available for use. There is no reason to believe that the
legislature intended to grant to municipalities the power to file
claims for an incomplete, unusuable improvement.
Id. at 388, 33 A.2d at 267.
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tion for the use intended or the date of legal authorization, which-
ever last occurs.
Nevertheless, the municipality is free to draft the ordinance
authorizing the improvement in a way which allows liens to be
filed before actual physical completion.8 2 All the municipality
need do in this regard is provide for a certificate of the supervis-
ing engineer to be issued when work is done in a particular street
or in front of a particular property and the statute provides that
such a certificate is "conclusive of the time of completion."8 3 In a
case where the property owner challenged a lien claiming the fil-
ing occurred more than six months after completion, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court concluded that the "legislative provision
leaves no room for the interposition of the defense mentioned.
s8 4
A claim filed within the six month period and satisfying other
requirements as to contents,8 5 remains a lien on the property for
five years unless paid or satisfied and may thereafter be revived
for successive five year periods.8 6 Once the claim has been filed
the property owner has an opportunity to attack its validity. His
means of attack, however, are limited by the Muncipal Claims Act.
Defects on the face of the claim make the claim subject to a motion
to strike off similar to a motion to strike off a defective judgment.8
On the merits, the property owner has two remedies under the Act.
Section 14 of the Act provides:
Any defendant named in the claim . . . may, at any
stage of the proceedings, present his petition, setting forth
that he has a defense in whole or in part thereto, and of
what it consists; and praying that a rule be granted upon
the claimant to file an affidavit of the amount claimed by
him;... and in the case of a municipal claim, to enter se-
curity in lieu of the claim .... 88
The property owner must allege he has a defense, then request
permission to pay into or enter security with the court. There-
upon the court will determine the amount, if any, of the claim ad-
mitted or insufficiently denied in the pleadings-the claim and the
petition or affidavit of defense-and that amount is awarded to
the municipality. 9 The property owner must pay into court the
82. See generally HECHT, supra note 21, at § 56.2.7.
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7143 (1957).
84. Philadelphia v. Street, 41 Pa. Super. 503, 507 (1910).
85. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7144 (1957).
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7183 (1957).
87. Borough of Berwick v. Smethers, 105 Pa. Super. 40, 42, 160 A. 148,
148 (1932).
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7182 (1957).
89. See generally HECHT, supra note 21, at §§ 14.2, 14.3.
amount of the claim still in dispute and then the lien is cancelled.9
The lien is stricken from the judgment index. At this point the
property owner is entitled to a jury trial of the disputed issues.91
As an alternative remedy, the property owner may serve notice
upon the claimant municipality to issue a writ of scire facias under
Section 16 of the Municipal Claims Act 9 2 and obtain an adjudica-
tion of the validity of the lienf' If the municipality fails to issue
the writ within fifteen days, the lien is stricken; if the writ is is-
sued, the municipality suffers a compulsory nonsuit if it discon-
tinues or fails to appear in the suit.9 4 Where this procedure is fol-
lowed, the property owner has fifteen days to file an affidavit of
defense95 from the date of service of the writ or from the date of
last weekly advertisement of the writ as the case may be.96 Of
course the municipality may sue on its claim by writ of scire facias
issued at its own request.9 7 In either case, Section 19 of the Act
provides for judgment for want of an affidavit of defense; where
an affidavit of defense is filed but insufficiently denies certain
elements of the claim, a rule may be taken for so much of the
claim as is insufficiently denied.9 8
Neither Section 1419 nor Section 19100 which set forth the pro-
visions for the affidavit of defense further define or particularize
what is required. Pennsylvania courts, however, have consis-
tently required that an affidavit of defense be "certain and defi-
nite" to be sufficient in whole or part."' As a corollary rule,
courts have also stated that a vague and uncertain affidavit is in-
sufficient to prevent judgment.10 2 A few examples will illustrate
the difficult position this puts the property owner in. A valid de-
fense to a claim for the cost of paving a street is that the paving is
not original.'0 3 The theory is that the first paving is of particular
benefit to abutting property thereby justifying the special assess-
ment, but repair costs can not be charged to particular owners of
90. Philadelphia v. Merz, 28 Pa. Super. 227 (1905).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7182 (1957).
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7184 (1957).
93. City of New Kensington v. Gardner, 372 Pa. 72, 92 A.2d 685 (1953).
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7184 (1957).
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, J 7186 (1957).
96. Id. This section provides for personal service, as in the case of
summons, on defendants in the county, deputized service on those in other
counties in the Commonwealth and service by publication where the de-
fendants cannot be located.
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7185 (1957).
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7271 (1957).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7182 (1957).
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7271 (1957).
101. Pittsburgh v. MacConnell, 130 Pa. 463, 18 A. 645 (1889) ("certain
and definite"); Philadelphia v. Pachelli, 168 Pa. Super. 54, 76 A.2d 436
(1950) ("pleaded with particularity"); Pittsburgh v. Daly, 5 Pa. Super. 528
(1897) ("direct and positive").
102. Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Pa. 255 (1869).
103. Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146 (1870).
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abutting property. In Hammett v. Philadelphia0 4 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court stated:
Repairing streets is as much a part of the ordinary duties
of the municipality-for the general good-as cleaning, watch-
ing and lighting. It would lead to monstrous injustice and
inequality should such general expense be provided for by
local assessment.10 5
Inspite of the possible injustice, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
found an affidavit of defense, which made reference to a prior ordi-
nance authorizing paving of a street and which alleged that a con-
tract was let and paving done and abutting property owners paid
assessments for the cost, to be insufficient under the "certain and
definite" standard. 06 Pennsylvania courts have held insufficient
an affidavit of defense which failed to state the date when a pre-
vious contract for paving was performed and the names of prop-
erty owners who had paid the original assessment'0 7 and an affi-
davit which failed to state the material with which the street was
originally paved.' 0 8
Some affidavits of defense have been found to be sufficient to
prevent judgment under the "certain and definite" test. 09 In one
early case,110 an affidavit of defense stating that the defendant's
property had a frontage of 40 feet was held sufficient to defeat a
claim based on 47 front feet and reduce the assessment to an
amount proper for 40 feet."' This litigation over mistake in the
assessment bill is interesting in that it indicates municipal officers
and elected officials might be willing to let property owners try
to formulate certain and definite affidavits of defense rather than
to compromise disputes. This may be especially true where the
amount of the dispute is small or the proof of the defense is scant.
The effect of the judicial requirement that the affidavit of de-
fense be "certain and definite" is to place a great hardship on the
property owner who must make out his defense in detail where
the municipality, not the property owner, has the necessary facts
and records. Moreover, in matters which are tried, the burden of
proof is on the property owner, the party with the least informa-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 156.
106. Philadelphia v. Pachelli, 168 Pa. Super. 54, 76 A.2d 436 (1950).
107. Id.
108. Harrisburg v. Baptist, 156 Pa. 526, 27 A. 8 (1893).
109. See, e.g., Scranton v. Levers, 200 Pa. 56, 49 A. 980 (1901); City of
Easton v. Stankus, 29 Northamp. 59 (Pa. C.P. 1943). See also City of
Chester v. Holden, 73 Pa. Super 465 (1920).
110. Thomas v. The Northern Liberties, 13 Pa. 117 (1850).
111. Id. at 117.
tion.112 It is well established that because the municipal claim "is
prima facie evidence of the facts averred therein;' 1 3 any aver-
ments not specifically denied are conclusive against the property
owner" 4 and defenses are affirmative in nature with the burden
of producing sufficient evidence to require the issue to be submit-
ted to the jury upon the property owner.115 Furthermore, at-
tempts to set-off or counterclaim have generally met with little
success.""'
It is clear that the provisions of the Municipal Claims Act and
the judicial interpretation thereof put the property owner in a dis-
advantaged position compared with the defendant in a creditor-
debtor suit or in an action in assumpsit.117 Furthermore, the
property owner cannot look to equity since courts refuse to hear
bills in equity attacking the validity of assessments or seeking to
enjoin the filing of claims"'8 because there is an adequate and
complete statutory remedy at law covering any objection or de-
fense."1
9
III. REQUISITES OF DUE PROCESS IN ENCUMBERING REAL PROPERTY
The property owner in Pennsylvania, whose property is subject
to an assessment for the costs of a public improvement and a lien
if the assessment remains unpaid, has very limited judicial means
and remedies to challenge the municipal claim. Statutory reme-
dies at law are restricted in that no prior hearing is afforded and
remedies after the filing of a lien are constrained by the "certain
and definite" requirement for the affidavit of defense 120 and the
112. See generally HEcHT, supra note 21, at § 26.4.
113. PA. STAT. ANu. tit. 53, § 7187 (1957).
114. Borough of North Catasauqa v. Thomas, 95 Pa. Super. 546 (1929);
East Lampeter Township v. Groff, 46 York 103 (Pa. C.P. 1932).
115. Philadelphia v. Rice & Sons, 274 Pa. 256, 118 A. 14 (1922).
116. Philadelphia v. Edmunds, 59 Pa. Super. 318 (1915) (setoff for
value of granite blocks converted by contractor denied in to use claim).
But see York City v. Miller, 60 Pa. Super. 407 (1915), modified on other
grounds and aff'd 254 Pa. 436, 98 A. 1049 (1916). As an added deterrent
to suits, Section 20 of the Municipal Claims Act provides for municipality's
attorney fees to be paid by the property owner if he loses the case. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7187 (1957).
117. The municipality may elect to proceed in assumpsit; see PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 7251 (1957).
118. See Geesey v. City of York, 254 Pa. 397, 99 A. 27 (1916); Baldwin
v. City of Erie, 94 Pa. Super. 106 (1928); Weston v. Borough of Tamaqua,
29 Sch. Leg. Rec. 65 (Pa. C.P. 1930).
119. In Hillibush v. Borough of Pottstown, 69 Montg. 199 (Pa. C.P.
1953) a bill in equity was filed to enjoin the levy of a street paving assess-
ment. Defendant borough's preliminary objections were sustained and the
bill dismissed; the court pointed out that Section 14 of the Municipal Claims
Act provides an adequate remedy at law. The court might also have
pointed to the alternative remedy under Section 16. See HEcHT, supra
note 21, at § 25.1.
120. See cases cited note 103 supra.
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fact that the property owner has the burden of proof.
121 Most
courts reject the property owner's attempt to sue in equity because
the statute is viewed as establishing a sole and adequate remedy
and because the issue is not ripe or the matter is committed to
municipal government discretion. 122 Moreover, the municipality
need not notify the owner of intention to file a lien; it must only
publish the ordinance authorizing the improvement and notify the
owner of the assessment.
123
This is the situation which confronted Louis and Sarah Sager,
property owners in the Borough of Pottstown, when, in the fall of
1971, the 76.42 foot portion of the street in front of their property
was constructed or reconstructed. 124 The work was completed and
on November 15, 1971 they received an assessment bill for $554.35,
their 1/3 share of the cost.1 25 The letter with the bill requested
payment within thirty days and stated that upon failure to pay, a
lien would be placed on their property.126 The Sagers sent a letter
to the Council claiming that the work was not original paving and
that the assessment was therefore improper.127 They further re-
quested a hearing before Borough Council, a judge, or an impartial
arbiter, on the merits of the municipal claim before the lien was
filed.128 When this request was denied, the Sagers filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania.129 They alleged that the filing of a lien without a hear-
ing violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 30
which provides:
[N] or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... 31
A three judge panel convened to decide whether due process
requires notice of intention to file a lien and a hearing prior to the
121. See notes 114-18 and accompaning text supra.
122. See notes 38-39, 120-21 and accompanying text supra.
123. See notes 26-27, 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
124. Brief of Plaintiffs at 1, Sager v. Burgess and Borough of Potts-
town, Civil No. 72-1.115 (E.D. Pa., filed June 7, 1972).
125. Id.
126. Id. The mention that a lien would be filed if the assessment is
not paid is not required by the Borough Code or the Claims Act but is
a practice followed by Pottstown.
127. Id.
128. Brief of Defendant at 3, Sager v. Burgess and Borough of Potts-
town, Civil No. 72-1115 (E.D. Pa., filed June 7, 1972).
129. Id.
130. Complaint at 1-2, Sager v. Burgess and Borough of Pottstown,
Civil No. 72-1115 (E.D. Pa., filed June 7, 1972).
131. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § I (emphasis added).
filing of a lien to preserve municipal claims, ruled that the pro-
cedure under the Municipal Claims Act is "not so fundamentally
unfair as to constitute a denial of due process. '13 2 The court con-
cluded that a lien is a property right.183 Under Pennsylvania law
a lien is a property interest in its own right3 4 and as such, is a
right to, or interest in, land which may subsist ... to the
diminution of the value of the estate of the tenant .... 185
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the fourteenth amend-
ment may require a hearing prior to the taking of property in
some situations, but disagreed with plaintiffs that a prior hearing
was required in the context of the Municipal Claims Act. 3 6 The
decision is consistent with decisions which have found other pro-
cedures for collection of governmental revenues to be valid. In
cases which have considered attacks on statutory procedures for
assessing costs of public improvements 3 7 or assessing taxes,1 8 the
courts have held that statutes disallowing judicial intervention un-
til the proper authorities have made their determination do not
constitute a taking of property without due process of law.1 9
Such decisions seem to indicate that due process does not require
a hearing at any time prior to apportioning the cost of the public
improvement, preparing the assessment bills and sending them
to the property owners. The United States Supreme Court has
stated;
Where, as here, [suit for refund after paying tax provided
for by the statute] adequate opportunity is afforded for a
later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary
proceedings to secure prompt performance of pecuniary ob-
ligations to the government have been consistantly sus-
tained.
140
Moreover, the decision in Sager is not a withdrawal from or
limitation of the recent cases which have extended the scope of
protection of the due process clause. Several courts have held that
prior notice and hearing will be required where a property interest
or use of property has been impaired.' 4I Thus, it has recently
132. Memorandum Opinion dated November 20, 1972 at 6, Sager v.
Burgess and 'Borough of Pottstown, Civil No. 72-1115 (E.D. Pa., filed
June 7, 1972).
133. Id. at 5.
134. In re Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co., 135 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1943).
135. Kraft v. Hankin, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 36, 38 (York 1957).
136. Memorandum Opinion dated November 20, 1972 at 5, Sager v. Bur-
gess and Borough of Pottstown,, Civil No. 72-1115 (E.D. Pa., filed June 7,
1972).
137. Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U.S. 207 (1915); French v. Barber
Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324 (1901).
138. Hamilton v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
139. Id. at 471.
140. Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 583, 595 (1931).
141. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969);
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970);
Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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been held that distress sales under distraint procedures of the
Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act 142 amount to a taking of
property without due process insofar as a tenant is deprived of
his property without a hearing even though the property may be
returned at a later time.14 3 These recent decisions have broad-
ened the term "property" to include the use of property, at least
in some instances. 144 The scope of the protection of the due proc-
ess clause is not limited to a "specialized type of property present-
ing distinct problems in our economic system"' 4 as some com-
mentators were led to believe.1 46 In Fuentes v. Shevin 147 the
United States Supreme Court rejected such a narrow interpreta-
tion and made it clear that the fourteenth amendment speaks of
"property" generally. 14 However, the situation in those recent
cases where an individual debtor and creditor were parties and the
state action or color thereof was the enactment of statutory pro-
cedure for replevin, garnishment, or distraint, is different from
the situation in Sager, where a real property owner and a munici-
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.101-397 (1965).
143. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
144. See generally Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process
Into A New Substance: An Expanding Protection For Personal Liberty
and A "Specialized Type of Property . . . In Our Economic System," 66
Nw. U.L. REv. 502 (1971).
145. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
146. See, e.g., Note, Innkeepers' Liens and The Requirements of Due
Process, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 481, 489 (1971); Comment, The Growth
of Procedural Due Process Into A New Substance: An Expanding Pro-
tection for Personal Liberty and A "Specialized Type of Property ...
In Our Economic System," 66 Nw. U. L. Rzv. 502, 506 (1971).
147. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
148. Id. at 90. The Court held that Pennsylvania and Florida pre-
judgment replevin statutes worked a deprivation of property without pro-
cedural due process of law insofar as they denied the right to an opportunity
to be heard before chattels were taken from their possessors. The lower
courts had held that the property involved-stove, stereo, table, bed, etc.-
was not the type deserving protection since the items were not absolute
necessities of life. In reversing the decisions of the lower courts, the
Court stated:
[The courts] reasoned that Sniadach and Goldberg ... estab-
lished no more than that a prior hearing is required with respect
to the deprivation of such basically "necessary" items as wages
and welfare benefits .... Both decisions were in the mainstream
of past decisions having little or nothing to do with the absolute
"necessities" of life but established that due process requires an
opportunity for a hearing before a deprivation of property takes
affect. [citations omitted] In none of those cases did the court
hold that this most basic due process requirement is limited to pro-
tection of only a few types of property interests. While Sniadach
and Goldberg emphasized the special importance of wages and wel-
fare benefits they did not convert that emphasis into a new
and more limited constitutional doctrine.
Id. at 88-89.
pality are parties and the state has enacted a statutory procedure
for the filing of liens against the real estate for costs of public im-
provements. Not only are the parties different and stand in a
different relation, but the extent of the state action or participa-
tion is greater.
Rarely would seizure without a hearing be justified whether
done by a private creditor or the government.149 Nevertheless,
there are extraordinary situations which justify the taking of
property by a summary proceeding, 150 and the requirement for a
prior hearing before the taking of property may be modified
where a "valid governmental interest is at stake."''1 1 In holding
constitutional the procedure for collecting internal revenue by fil-
ing liens against real estate,152 the United States Supreme Court
noted that it was essential that governmental needs be immedi-
ately satisfied, the government must secure its revenues promptly,
and there is a procedure whereby the individual could obtain a
hearing-pay the tax and file suit for a refund. 53
In sustaining the constitutional validity of the Municipal
Claims Act, the court in Sager determined that a compelling state
interest prevails over that of the individual property owner.'"
The court relied on the extraordinary situations argument in stat-
ing:
It is common knowledge that a municipality finances its
public improvements either through its tax revenue or
through other assessments that it levies. If the muni-
cipal improvement is a large one and the term of years over
which the taxes or assessments to pay for the improvement
will be long, the municipality can resort to a bond issue
wherein it pledges its revenue over that long term of years
in return for the immediate fund with which to pay the
contractors .... [The security for the bonds is a] pledge
of the municipality's future revenue or a promise by the
municipality to adopt ordinances and impose assessments
in order to assure recovery of the funds from land owners
that in turn will make the bonds secure on the public mar-
ket. [Declaring the Municipal Claims Act invalid] would
prevent a municipal authority from determining the ex-
tent to which it could expect ... rentals from the subject
149. Id. at 90-91. The court reviewed the prior cases finding only a
bank failure and attachment to secure jurisdiction over a non-resident
have justified outright seizure. See Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277
U.S. 29 (1928) and Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
150. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972). See also Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245 (1947); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 554 (1921); North American Cold
Storage Co. v. Chicago, 21 U.S. 306 (1908).
151. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
152. Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 583 (1931).
153. Id. at 595-97.
154. Memorandum Opinion dated November 20, 1972 at 8, Sager v.




matter of its financing program with the consequence that
it could not be relied upon to meet its obligations.... The
heart of municipal finance is the municipality's ability to
have resources fixed and pledged in advance so that the po-
tential public investor can recognize that the security he
is about to buy is a stable one."5'
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Constitution does not require a hear-
ing prior to the filing of a municipal claim as a lien on real prop-
erty, and that the determination of the court in Sager is sound in
this regard. The filing of a municipal claim is an extraordinary
situation where a valid governmental interest must be protected-
the government needs to collect revenue to pay for expenses. Fur-
thermore, the general public interest is benefited by by early re-
payment of the costs of public improvements. The municipality
will be able to continue to make public improvements and the over-
all costs of projects can be kept to a minimum by early repayment
of bonds. There is a need for prompt action in filing a lien to
prevent the muncipality from being insulated from its only source
of collateral for the bonds which are issued to raise money for con-
struction costs. That collateral is the benefited real estate.' 56
Assessments for cost and bills for rental of water and sewer sys-
tems are the means of retiring these bonds and the municipal claim
as a lien is the only means of securing payment of assessments
and rentals. Delaying the time when a lien can be filed could lead
to instability in municipal financing and restrict the initiation and
completion of public improvements in Pennsylvania. 157
This is not to say, however, that the Municipal Claims Act is
free from criticism. Although the Constitution does not mandate
a hearing prior to the filing of a lien by the municipality, due proc-
ess does require notice and hearing at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.158 The enabling acts and other statutory au-
thorization for public improvements provide for published notice
of the ordinance and notice of the assessment to be sent to the
property owner, 59 but neither the Claims Act nor any other statu-
tory provision requires notice of intention to file a lien.160 "Mean-
155. Id. at 8-9.
156. See notes 157-58 and accompanying text supra.
157. Memorandum Opinion dated November 20, 1972 at 8, Sager v.
Burgess and Borough of Pottstown, Civil No. 72-11.15 (E.D. Pa., filed June
7, 1972).
158. Armstrong v. Manze, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
159. See notes 25-26, 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
ingful notice" should mean notice of the lien since it is the lien
which initiates the deprivation of property, not the assessment bill.
"Meaningful hearing" cannot mean a hearing procedure weighted
heavily against the property owner. The hearing should be aimed
at establishing the validity of the "underlying claim" 161, and, to this
end, the way should be clear for a judicial determination of all dis-
putes, large and small, which cannot be resolved by the property
owner and the officials of the municipality. In practice, the pres-
ent statutory scheme deters suits, especially suits for small
amounts. Yet the municipality, knowing that if the property
owner goes to court he must post security, his defenses must be
"certain and definite," and he has the burden of proof, may not at-
tempt to work out settlements. Considering that most disputes
are small, the total amount of the municipal claim many times is
less than five hundred dollars, 162 the Municipal Claims Act estab-
lishes a procedure whereby the rights of property owners are af-
fected without due process of law.
With the foregoing in mind, the following procedure is pro-
posed as an alternative to the current scheme under the Municipal
Claims Act. When the right to file a claim has accrued-within
six months of actual physical and legal completion of the improve-
ment, and not before the time of such completion, and as specified
in the relevant ordinances-the municipality may file its claim as
a hen on the benefited real estate. Notice of intention to file
should accompany the lien and a copy should be sent to the prop-
erty owner by registered mail. 0 3 The notice should specify that a
lien is filed encumbering real estate under authority of the statute
and ordinances and that the property owner has 20 days to appear
and contest the claim.' 6 4 A copy of the municipal claim sent with
the notice of the lien would serve as a complaint in modified
form.165 Thereafter the matter would proceed as in other civil
matters. 106
Although it is not within the scope of this Comment to draft
amendments to the Act necessary to effect the proposal, or even
to suggest all the sections of the Act which should be amended,
some alterations suggest themselves immediately. First, a provi-
sion for notice of intention to file the lien would have to be added
to Section 9 of the Act.1 7 Second, the affidavit of defense, as it
is presently construed, would have to be abolished, necessitating
161. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969).
162. Brief of Plaintiffs at 7-8, Sager v. Burgess and Borough of Potts-
town, Civil No. 72-1115 (E.D. Pa., filed June 7, 1972).
163. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 527, 573 (1953).
164. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1026.
165. See generally HECHT, supra note 21, at § 10.
166. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1029-1038 (Actions at Law).
167. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7143 (1957).
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changes in Sections 1418 and 19.' 69 Finally, Section 20,170 which
states that the municipal claim is prima facie evidence of the facts
averred therein and under which the burden of proof is on the
property owner, would need modification.
The present scheme for filing Pennsylvania municipal claims
must be changed to prevent the injustice to property owners which
is occurring. This Comment suggests legislative revision of the no-
tice and post-filing hearing provisions of the Municipal Claims Act
as the best means to accomplish the change. Without legislative
action, the courts might, in the proper case, order that no municipal
claims be filed as liens under the Act.1
71
JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM
168. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7182 (1957).
169. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7271 (1957).
170. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7187 (1957).
171. In Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), alfd, 405
U.S. 191 (1972), where the remedies available after the taking of property
were not unlike the remedies available to the owner after a municipal
claim has been filed against his property, the district court ordered no
judgments on confession of judgment clauses be entered by Pennsylvania
county prothonotaries against the class of plaintiffs therein. Id. at 1094.
In Sager the district court reserved the issue of issuing a similar injunction
where the class of plaintiffs was different than the one before it.
Since plaintiffs have not introduced any evidence to establish that
they are persons of low income and unable to post bond [required
under Sections 14 and 16 to attack the claim on its merits] we
find in unnecessary to reach this alleged ground of unconstitution-
ality.
Memorandum Opinion dated November 20, 1972 at 7, Sager v. Burgess and
Borough of Pottstown, Civil No. 72-1115 (E.D. Pa., filed June 7, 1972). On
April 23, 1973 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the district court in Sager leaving undecided the issue reserved by the
district court and, for the present, leaving change in the Municipal Claims
Act to the Pennsylvania legislature. See 41 U.S.L.W. 3569 (1973).
